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Abstract
In this paper we present a new approach for the secure and robust copyright protection of
digital images. We describe a system for generating digital watermarks and for trading wa-
termarked images. The system is based on a new watermarking technique, which is robust
against image transformation techniques such as compression, rotation, translation, scaling and
cropping. It uses modulation of the magnitude components in Fourier space to embed a water-
mark and an accompanying template and, during watermark extraction, reads a template in the
log polar transform of the frequency domain. The template is used for analyzing scaling and
rotation suered by the watermarked stego-image. The detection of the watermarks is also pos-
sible without any need for the original cover-image. In addition, the system applies asymmetric
cryptographic protocols for dierent purposes, namely embedding=detecting the watermark and
transferring watermarked data. The public key technique is applied for the construction of a one-
way watermark embedding and the verication function to identify and prove the uniqueness of
the watermark. Legal dispute resolution is supported for the multiple watermarking of a digital
image without revealing the condential keying information. c© 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.
Keywords: Copyright protection; Digital images; Digital watermark; Asymmetric cryptography;
Robustness
( All methods, procedures and schemes presented in this paper are based on the European patent application
No. 97 810 708.4.
(( This work has been founded by the Swiss National Science Foundation under the SPP program (Grant.
5003-45334).
 Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ORuanaidh@cui.unige.ch (J. O. Ruanaidh), holger.petersen@entrust.com (H. Petersen),
Herrigel@usa.net (A. Herrigel), Pereira@cui.unige.ch (S. Pereira), thierry.pun@cui.unige.ch (T. Pun).
0304-3975/99/$ - see front matter c© 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0304 -3975(99)00069 -9
118 J. O. Ruanaidh et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 226 (1999) 117{142
1. Introduction
The current rapid development and deployment of new IT technologies for the fast
provision of commercial multimedia services has resulted in a strong demand for re-
liable and secure copyright protection techniques for multimedia data. Copyright pro-
tection of digital images is dened as the process of proving the intellectual property
rights to a court of law against the unauthorized reproduction, processing, transforma-
tion or broadcasting of a digital image. Depending on the law in various countries, this
process may be based on a prior registration of the copyright with a trusted third party.
After successful registration, the copyright ownership is legally bound by a copyright
notice, which is required to notify and prove copyright ownership.
Digital watermarking is a method for marking data sets, such as images, sound or
video. A stego data set consists of the original data, the cover data set and a digital
watermark that does not aect the data set’s usability but that can be detected using
dedicated analysis software or systems. Watermarking can, for example, be used for
marking authorship or ownership of a data set.
Quite a number of dierent approaches [5; 7{11; 13; 18; 19; 28{37; 39; 40] to digital
watermarking have been proposed but only some of them implemented in commer-
cial products. Due to the very short time and minimal eort needed for copying and
distributing digital multimedia data, protection against copyright infringements is an
important issue for the copyright owner and should form an integral part of the ex-
ploitation process for Internet-based trading services. Today, the Internet community
has not identied or accepted adequate copyright protection techniques. This is in direct
contrast to the provision of secure transaction protocols, such as SSL [12].
2. State-of-the-art
Digital watermarking can be seen as being fundamentally a problem in digital com-
munications [7]. Early methods of encoding watermarks consisted of no more than
incrementing an image component to encode a binary ‘1’ and decrementing to encode
a ‘0’ [5]. Tirkel et al. [34] and van Schyndel et al. [35] have applied the properties
of m-sequences to produce oblivious watermarks resistant to ltering, cropping and
reasonably robust to cryptographic attack. Matsui and Tanaka [19] have applied linear
predictive coding for watermarking. Their approach to hide a watermark is to make
the watermark resemble quantization noise. Tirkel and Osborne [34] were the rst
to note the applicability of spread spectrum techniques to digital image watermarking.
Spread spectrum has several advantageous features. It oers cryptographic security (see
[34]) and is capable of achieving error free transmission of the watermark at the limits
given by the maximum channel capacity [31]. Fundamental information theoretic limits
to reliable communication have been discussed by some authors (see [31]). The shorter
is the payload of a watermark, the better are the chances of it being communicated
reliably.
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Spread spectrum is an example of a symmetric key cryptosystem [30]. System secu-
rity is based on proprietary knowledge of the keys (or pseudo random seeds) which are
required to embed, extract or remove an image watermark. One provision in the use of
a spread spectrum system is that it is important that the watermarking be non-invertible
because only in this way can true ownership of the copyright material be resolved [8].
O Ruanaidh et al. [28] and Cox et al. [7] have developed perceptually adaptive trans-
form domain methods for watermarking. In contrast to previous approaches the empha-
sis was on embedding the watermark in the most signicant components of an image.
The general approach used in these papers is to divide the image into blocks. Each
block is mapped into the transform domain using either the discrete cosine transform
(DCT) [24], the Hadamard transform [6] or the Daubechies wavelet transform [27].
Information has been embedded using the DCT [29] or FFT magnitude and phase,
wavelets (see Refs. of Press et al. [29]), Linear predictive coding [19] and fractals
[10]. Delaigle et al. [11] have applied signature labeling techniques for the copyright
protection of digital images.
The industrial importance of digital copyright protection has resulted in a number
of products, either based on specic watermark techniques or additional registration
services. They include the PictureMarc system by Digimarc, SureSign (former FBI’s
Fingerprint) by HighWater Signum, IP2 system by Intellectual Protocols, the Agent
system by Digital Information Commodities Exchange and the Tigermark system from
NEC. Further, some prototypes have been developed among which are the PixelTag
system by the MIT Media Lab and the SysCop system from Zhao and Koch of the
Frauenhofer-Institut fur Graphische Datenverarbeitung [40, 39]. Many of these systems
have been subject to attacks, that destroy the marking or at least reveal signicant
limitations of the marking techniques [2, 3, 2, 25, 26].
3. Overview
We envision the watermark system operating an open environment like the Internet
with dierent interconnected computers. Users can be located anywhere and can sell or
buy images. If legal dispute resolution for multiple watermarks is needed the copyright
holder (H) sends copyright information and authentic image information to the Copy-
right Certicate Center (C). After having received a copyright certicate from C, the
copyright holder can sell his digital images, for example, via an image shopping mall,
to an image buyer (B). The public key infrastructure (PKI) supports the distribution of
authentic public keys between all parties which are needed for mutual authentication,
non-repudiation and condentiality. The communication channels between the parties
are shown in Fig. 1.
Our approach enables the secure generation and transmission of watermarked data
using an asymmetric key pair like applied in public-key cryptography. The cover data
set is watermarked, while the watermark is encoded using one or both of these keys.
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Fig. 1. Communication channels between identied parties.
The resulting stego data set is then transmitted to a second party, while the same keys
are used for establishing a secure transmission between the parties.
During the trading process, the involved parties use asymmetric key pairs and a key
agreement protocol for establishing a symmetric key between them. The party creating
the watermark can embed a private, a detection and a public watermark in the data set.
The public watermark can be detected by third parties while the private and detection
watermark can only be detected by the copyright holder.
After embedding the digital watermark into the image, the information describing it,
such as the image identier, a textual description and related information is transmitted
authentically to a registration party that permanently stores a record relating to this
stego data set and issues a copyright certicate which it stores and transmits to the
copyright holder.
A template pattern is added to the Fourier transform of an image to be water-
marked. For checking the watermark, the Fourier transform of the stego-image is cal-
culated. From this Fourier transform, the log polar mapping transform is generated,
which is then searched for the modulation pattern. Using the log polar transform of
the Fourier transform has the advantage that scaling and rotation of the stego-image
are expressed as translations. This allows an easy search for rotation and scaling using
cross-correlation techniques. The magnitude components of the Fourier transform of
each image block is modulated using the same pattern in each block. This method
provides robustness against cropping of the stego-image because the magnitude spec-
trum is invariant to circular translations (cyclic shifts) and cropping leads to a circular
translation of the watermark in each block.
4. Threat model
For the reader’s convenience we describe dierent scenarios with typical people, such
as Alice, Bob and Mallet. Alice is the copyright holder. She has taken a very valuable
photograph, scanned it and would like to sell it to Bob in digital form. Mallet would
also like to sell or distribute the image himself. He has a lot of computing power and
he can listen and intercept=change any information that Alice and Bob transmitted on
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Fig. 2. Main transactions during watermarking.
Table 1
Identied threats and exploitation assessment
Threat Description Exploitation
1 Mallet buys the image and distributes it further High
2 Mallet embeds his own watermark and registers the image himself High
3 Mallet removes the watermark High
4 Counterfeit original attack High
5 Statistical removal attack High
6 Reduced colour image attack High
7 Mallet performs the known plaintext attack High
8 Mallet destroys Alice’s image or copyright certicate High
9 Mallet steals the watermarked image (from Alice or Bob) during High
transmission
10 Watermark collision High
11 Mallet steals Alice’s cover-image and=or secret key Medium
12 Mallet intercepts and changes the image sent to Bob High
13 The watermark was removed and Alice cannot discover fraud High
14 Denial-of-service attacks such as Bob paid for the image Low
but did not receive it
15 C loses Alice’s information Low
16 The issued copyright certicate is not legally bound Low
17 Mallet destroys or alters the copyright certicate High
18 Mallet impersonates Alice and registers images at C High
19 Alice loses her secret key Low
20 Mallet sets up an image server in a country that does not support Low
copyright laws and distributes \stolen" images
21 Bob paid, but did not receive the correct image Low
22 Mallet can nd out which images Bob is buying Low
23 Mallet impersonates Bob Medium
24 Alice denies to have sent a copyright request to C Low
the Internet. Fig. 2 shows a basic commercial scenario. We list the encountered risks
for each party in Table 1.
It is beyond the scope of the paper to discuss all possible threats in detail. We have
listed them in Table 1 along with the exploitation assessment. We now analyse some
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of the risks for Alice and Bob. Alice’s main interest is to protect her cover-image,
register it and receive a legally bound copyright certicate from C. She wants to have
guarantee that nobody can access the cover-image and that the copyright certicate
is saved permanently by C. When registering the image, Alice wants to be certain
that she receives a copyright certicate for a novel image and that the legal binding
is guaranteed by C. She can, therefore, successfully sue fraudulent behaviour. Bob is
particularly interested to receive the images he wants and he has paid for. Mallet on
the other hand is very antisocial and tries to hurt Alice or Bob wherever possible.
Mallet tries to steal information and sell it himself. We discuss some of the important
threats that have been identied:
(1) Mallet buys the image but distributes it further: Mallet has bought an image
from Alice. Without Alice’s approval, he sells it himself.
(2) Mallet embeds his own watermark and registers the image himself: Mallet buys
an image from Alice and embeds himself a watermark. He then lls in his copy-
right information and registers the image at his C.
(3) Mallet removes the watermark: Mallet removes Alice’s watermark, embeds his
own and sells the image.
(4) Counterfeit original attack: In [9] it was shown that if an invertible watermark
embedding function is used, an attack called the counterfeit original, is possible.
(5) Statistical removal attack: Mallet rst embeds a large number of watermarks
in the image, using the same method as Alice. He now starts to apply image
transformations until all of his embedded watermarks disappear. With a calculable
condence, the watermark embedded by Alice also vanished.
(6) Reduced colour image attack: Alice tries to watermark a logo that consists only
of very few colours. The watermarking algorithm adds more colours and they
become visible in the image. Mallet only needs to apply a \de speckle" algorithm
to successfully remove the watermark.
(7) Mallet performs a known plaintext attack: With any watermarking scheme, an
attacker could apply a known plaintext attack to nd out Alice’s private key.
Mallet could steal the cover-image and the watermark message if Alice is not
cautious enough in hiding them. Then he can try to derive Alice’s key from the
given information. This is known as a known plaintext attack.
(8) Mallet destroys Alice’s image or copyright certicate: Mallet wants to sell
Alice’s image himself. He therefore attacks Alice’s system and destroys the cover-
image, the private key and the copyright certicate.
(9) Mallet steals watermarked image from Alice or Bob during transmission: Mallet
tries to obtain the watermarked image without paying. He tries to attack through
a security hole in Alice’s or Bob’s computer or read the image while it is trans-
mitted.
(10) Watermark collision: Mallet found out that when he extracts a watermark with
his key out of Alice’s image he gets a meaningful watermark message. He
could then claim that Alice stole his image and embedded her watermark on top
of his.
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5. Copyright protection and image owner authentication
Depending on the proof-level to be provided for the protection, our approach provides
three increasing levels of reliability, namely: individual copyright protection protection,
copyright protection with registered cryptographic keys and copyright protection with
C on the basis of registered cryptographic keys. The present method is based on an
image owner authentication technique, described below, which embeds and detects the
image authentication data (IAD) as the payload of a watermark. The applied image
owner authentication technique is based on a perceptually adaptive spread spectrum
technique. This technique provides reliable means of embedding robust watermarks.
Such a technique will be discussed in Section 6. In addition, a spread spectrum tech-
niques is a form of symmetric cryptosystem. In order to embed or extract a watermark,
it is necessary to know the exact values of the seed used to produce pseudo random
sequences used to encode a watermark. The seeds are considered to be cryptographic
keys for watermark generation and verication. System security is therefore based on
proprietary knowledge of private keys, which provide in addition the necessary security
parameters needed for a secure communication (mutual authentication, integrity, con-
dentiality, non-repudiation) in the trading process of digital images. Because spread
spectrum signals are statistically independent (and therefore virtually orthogonal), the
present method and apparatus encodes more than one watermark in an image at the
same time, namely a private, a detection and a public watermark. The detection water-
mark is embedded under a xed random seed which serves H to eciently search for
his images on the Internet. He has to check only one embedding per picture to nd the
locations of his pictures. The public watermark indicates that the image is copyright
material and provide information on true ownership. At the same time there is a secure
private watermark whose secrecy depends on the private key of H. Since the public
key of H is registered, H can prove that he is the only person in the possession of the
adequate private key and therefore the generator of the private watermark. The system
also provides the secure registration (mutual authentication, integrity, non-repudiation)
of watermark encoded images (data sets) at C. Derived data of the stego image is
registered at C and a signed digital copyright certicate is generated by C and trans-
mitted to H. If an unauthorized third party has also encoded watermarks in the same
image, conicting claims in copyright disputes can be resolved, as only one of the two
parties has a copyright certicate of the image containing only its watermark. The other
party, who redistributed the original watermarked image, has only a certicate on the
image where both watermarks are embedded and thus can be identied as the cheating
party. Watermark protection with registered cryptographic keys and C based copyright
protection are based on a PKI. The PKI issues on request public key certicates, e.g.
X.509 certicates, containing the public key of the party, its distinguished name and
a time stamp. Every certicate is signed with the PKI’s private key and the trust is
built on the validity of the authentic copy of the PKI’s public key (we assume that the
public key of the PKI is accessible, authentically distributed and veriable by every
party).
124 J. O. Ruanaidh et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 226 (1999) 117{142
5.1. Cryptographic mechanisms
The following cryptographic mechanisms are used in the description [21]:
 (SigMRG(x; m; ), SigMRV (y; ; m)): A probabilistic digital signature scheme with
message recovery, where (x; y) denotes the key pair of the signer, m the input data
to be signed and  the signature,
 (SigAPG(x; m; ), SigAPV (y;m; )): A probabilistic digital signature scheme with
appendix, where (x; y) denotes the key pair of the signer, m the input data to be
signed and  the signature,
 AKAP(A; B; KAB; xA; yA; xB; yB): Asymmetric key agreement protocol (e.g. [16]) with
entity A’s keypair (xA; yA), entity B’s keypair (xB; yB), between the entities A and B.
After the protocol, the two entities have agreed on a symmetric key KAB.
 OIAE(X; Y; CI; SI): Oblivious image owner authentication embedding algorithm with
seed X, payload Y, cover image CI and res. stego image SI.
 OIAV(X; SI; Y ): Oblivious image owner authentication detection algorithm (cf.
Section 6) with seed X, stego image SI and resulting payload Y.
 h1; h2: collision resistant hash functions with hash value of appropriate length.
In principle, all known signature schemes and authentic key exchange protocols might
be used with our protocols. Nevertheless to obtain an ecient variant, we propose to
choose the Nyberg{Rueppel signature scheme with message recovery in a small mode,
where both signature parameters are computed in a small subgroup of order q [23, 14]
and q has about 160 bit. For the signature scheme with appendix one might choose
an ecient variant of the Meta-ElGamal signature scheme [15] in small mode. As
asymmetric key agreement protocol, we propose to choose a three-pass scheme with
mutual implicit authentication, as proposed in [16] as class 7. The hash function h1
should return a hash value of 64 bit and might e.g. be dened as a :=RIPEMD-
128(m); a= a1jja2; h1(m)= a1 a2: The hash function h2 should return a hash value of
160 bit (e.g. SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160).
5.2. Individual copyright protection
During individual copyright protection only the copyright holder H with distin-
guished nameH and asymmetric key pair (xH ; yH ) is involved. The following steps are
applied:
(1) H retrieves the cover image CI , generates a unique image identier IDI := h1
(nameH )jjSNI , where SNI is a serial number, and stores IDI .
(2) Embedding of private watermark:
(a) H generates the stego image SI0 applying the transformation OIAE(h2(); IDI ;
CI; SI0), where CI denotes the cover image, SI0 denotes the resulting stego
image and SigMRG(xH ; IDI jj(IDI (mod 263 + 1)); ).
(b) H stores  together with CI in a protected database.
(3) Embedding of detection watermark:
H generates OIAE(h2(xH ); SNI jjSNI ; SI0; SI).
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(4) Embedding of public watermark:
(a) H generates a public IADI := \Copyright by" jjCDSigjj \All Rights Reserved"
applying SigMRG(xH ; CD; CDSig) where CD := Initialsjjyearjj(Initialsjjyear)
(mod 231 + 1).
(b) H partitions IADI into blocks BLi; 16i6P of length 128 bit.
(c) H generates the stego image SI applying for every i; 16i6P, the transforma-
tion OIAE(h2(yH jjijjyH ); BLi; CIi; SIi), where CIi := SIi−1 is the cover image
(stego image from the previous iteration), CI1 = SI and SIi is resulting stego
image after iteration i.
The resulting stego image is SI := SIP .
(5) H stores SI and might generate a signed copyright certicate applying SigAPG(xH ;
SI; TS; SigSI), with SigSI as the signature of the stego image and TS a time stamp.
5.2.1. Cryptographic properties
Besides the robustness of the watermarks against various image transformations,
which is discussed in Section 6.4, the embedding of the private watermark oers useful
cryptographic properties:
 The seed for embedding the private watermark is probabilistic, as it depends on the
output of a probabilistic signature scheme. Thus even if the private watermark in
one image is detected this does not allow an attacker to nd immediately the private
watermarks in other protected images.
 The seed for embedding is image-dependent. Thus an attacker who knows a valid
image ID cannot embed this under a dierent seed, as this would not t with the
recovered ID from the signature with message used to generate the seed. The same
is true for an attacker who knows a valid signed seed and wants to use this to
embed his own image ID.
 The private watermark oers non-repudiation, as it can only be generated by the
copyright holder, who knows the corresponding private key. This allows the proof
of ownership to a judge.
 The signature  with message recovery remains secret until H has to prove his
ownership to a court. In this case, he does not have to reveal a secret to the
court, which would enable it to generate valid private watermarks instead of H
afterwards.
 The payload is very short. One could think of embedding the signed image ID under
a random seed instead of the described method. This leads to a longer message,
which is not as robust as the chosen one, if we assume that the image ID consists
of e.g. 12 byte. The shortest known signature scheme with message recovery [23, 14]
produces already a signature of length 20 byte. i.e. it is 80% longer.
5.3. Trading of digital images
Two parties are involved in the trading of digital images: the H and the image
buyer B with distinguished nameB. Suppose (xH ; yH ) is the asymmetric key pair of H
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and (xB; yB) is the asymmetric key pair of B. Suppose H has an authentic copy of yB
and B has an authentic copy of yH before they start any communication. The following
steps are applied during the trading of digital images:
(1) H and B execute AKAP(H; B; KHB; xH ; yH ; xB; yB) for the generation of a shared
symmetric session key KHB.
(2) B generates the Trading Request Envelope TRE := hTDjjSigTDi; with TD := fIDI jj
ExpTimejjnameBjjnameHg and SigAPG(xB, h2(TD), SigTD). ExpTime is the expiry
time of the TRE, which avoids replay of the same envelope. B transmits TRE to H.
(3) H receives TRE and veries TD, applying SigAPV (yB; SigTD; IVR) where IVR de-
notes the intermediate verication result. If IVR= h2(TD), with TD := IDI jj
ExpTimejjnameBjjnameH , then TD has been successfully veried and the next
step is executed. In any other case, the processing and communication between H
and B is stopped.
(4) If the verication was successful, H retrieves with IDI the corresponding stego
image SI and generates the Trading Response Envelope TSE := hTDjjSigTDi; with
TD :=KHB[SI ]jjExpTimejjnameH jjnameB and SigAPG(xH ; h2(TD); SigTD). H trans-
mits TSE to B.
(5) B receives TSE and veries TD by applying SigAPV (yH ; SigTD; IVR), where IVR
denotes the intermediate verication result. If IVR= h2(TD), with TD :=KHB[SI ]jj
ExpTimejjnameH jjnameB, then TD has been successfully veried.
B then deciphers KHB[SI ] and checks IAD applying for every i; 16i6P, the
following transformation: OIAV (h2(yH jjh2(i)jjyH ); SI; PLi), where SIi denotes the
stego image and PLi the detected payload of the ith public watermark. (If P is not
known, the procedure is iterated until no more public watermarks can be detected).
IADI is then generated by concatenating PLi, i.e. IADI :=PL1jj    jjPLN ;
16i6P. IADI should be of the format \Copyright by" jjCDSigjj \All Rights
Reserved". CDSig is then veried applying SigMRV (yH ; CDSig; OD), with OD
as the output data. If OD is Initialsjjyearjj(Initialsjjyear)(mod 231 + 1), B has
veried H as the copyright holder.
Remark. In the case of a legal copyright dispute, H can retrieve IADI and construct
the corresponding unique image IDI . Since the generation of the same asymmetric
key pair by two distinguished entities is very unlikely, the construction of the unique
image IDI provides a high level of proof against copyright infringement. In the case
of watermark protection with registered keys, the generation of the same asymmetric
key pair by two distinguished entities can be prevented.
5.4. Copyright protection with registered keys
The copyright protection with registered cryptographic keys needs three parties,
namely H with nameH , B with nameB and the PKI with nameI . Suppose (xH ; yH ),
(xB; yB), (xI ; yI ) are the unique key pairs of H, B, and I, respectively. Suppose, H
has an authentic and actual copy of CertB which signature was veried with the au-
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thentic copy of yI and B has an authentic and actual copy of CertH which signature
was veried with the authentic copy of yI . Then the same steps as for the individual
watermark protection are applied.
Remark. Since the generated asymmetric key pairs are unique, H can be uniquely
identied if no additional watermarks by unauthorized persons have been encoded into
a given SI . The O-based watermark protection described below provides the necessary
countermeasures to prevent this threat.
5.5. Copyright protection based on a copyright center
The system for copyright protection based on a copyright center has four participants,
namely H with nameH , B with nameB, the PKI with nameI and C with nameC . Suppose
(xH ; yH ), (xB; yB), (xI ; yI ) and (xC; yC) are the unique key pairs of H, B, I and C,
respectively. H has an authentic copy of CertB and CertC whose signatures were veried
with the authentic copy of yI , B has an authentic copy of CertH and CertC whose
signatures were veried with the authentic copy of yI and C has an authentic copy of
CertH and CertB whose signatures were veried with the authentic copy of yI . The
following steps are applied:
(1) Steps 1{4 of the individual watermark protection are applied, where the unique
image IDI is computed as IDI := h1(nameH jjnameC)jjSNI .
(2) H generates a thumbnail Thumb from SI and stores it together with the stego
image SI .
(3) H and C execute the following steps for the secure registration and the generation
of copyright certicates:
(a) H generates the copyright request data CRD := fh2(SI)jjh2(Thumb)jjIDIg and
the copyright request envelope CRE := hTDjjSigTDi, with TD := fCRDjj
ExpTimejjnameH jjnameCg and SigAPG(xH ; h2(TD); SigTD). H transmits CRE
to C.
(b) C receives CRE and veries it. For this C requests the certicate CertH
that belongs to nameH in CRE and obtains the authentic public key yH . C
checks the signature on TD by applying SigAPV (yH ; SigTD; h2(TD)), where
TD=CRDjjExpTimejjnameH jjnameC . Then C checks the semantical correct-
ness of TD. If all verications are passed, then CRE has been successfully
veried and the next step is executed.
(c) C generates the digital Copyright Certicate by executing SigAPG(xC;
CCD; SigCCD), where CCD := fnameC jjnameH jjSN jjIDI jjh2(SI)jjh2(Thumb)jj
UCCNg and UCCN := \(Copyright" jjyearjjnameH jj \All rights reserved". C
stores the copyright certicate CC :=CCDjjSigCCD together with h2(Thumb)
in its database, generates the copyright certicate envelope CCE :=hTDjjSigTDi,
with TD := fCCjjExpTimejjnameC jjnameHg and SigAPG(xC; TD; SigTD) and
transmits it to H.
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(d) H receives CCE and veries it by requesting the certicate CertC that be-
longs to nameC in CCE. H obtains the authentic public key yC which he
uses to check SigTD on TD by applying SigAPV (yC; SigTD; h2(TD)), where
TD := fCCjjExpTimejjnameC jjnameHg. H checks the semantical correctness
of TD and if all verications are correct then H stores CC in its
database.
(4) H and B might execute the image trading protocol described in Section 5.3.
Remark. B may check the copyright certicate requesting C to transfer an authentic
copy of the copyright certicate for a given image identier IDI . Except the data
transfer, the applied protocol is similar to the one described above. If B would like to
transfer a specic copyright of a CI to another legal party, he may initiate a copyright
revocation request with C. The dierent phases of this request are analogue to the
copyright request.
5.6. Watermark detection
The system for private watermark detection is executed by a single process, the H
with distinguished name nameH . H must be able to detect if an image GI in a list
of images is protected with its copyright. Therefore he has to check, if its detection
watermark is embedded in GI .
(1) H applies to GI the following transformation: OIAV (h1(xH ); GI; PL) and checks
if PL= SN jjSN .
(2) If PL is of suitable format H looks in its database for the corresponding CC =CCD
jjSigCCD, where CCD=fnameC jjnameH jjSN jjIDI jjh(SI)jjUCCNgjjSigCCD, and
SN appears in IDI . There it nds the corresponding physical address of SI . If
no entry in the database exists, H read a random string PL, which happens only
with probability 2−32.
(3) H gets the stego image SI .
(4) H checks if its private watermark is embedded in SI .
5.7. Watermark verication
In the case of a dispute, a judge must be able to check private watermarks in stego-
images. The system for private watermark verication is partitioned into two processes,
namely H with distinguished nameH and the judge with distinguished nameJ .
(1) H forwards nameH ; SI; SigCCD and Sig(IDI ) to J.
(2) J veries CC = fnameC jjnameH jjSN jjIDI jjh2(SI)jjUCCNgjjSigCCD by the follow-
ing steps:
(a) J checks the signature SigCCD by SigAPV (y0; SigCCD; CCD).
(b) J checks nameC , nameH , IDI , if h2(SI) corresponds to SI and if if UCCN
contains nameH .
(3) J veries the public key yH of H by requesting the certicate Certh that corre-
sponds to nameH .
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(4) J checks that Sig(IDI ) was issued by H with distinguished nameH .
(5) J checks the appearance of IDI in the image applying the transformation OIAV (h2
(Sig(IDI )); SI; PL), where PL denotes the detected private watermark. If PL= IDI
then J has checked that SI contained a private watermark of H. This proves
together with SigCCD that H is the legal owner of SI .
6. Oblivious image owner authentication
The watermarking technique comprises the following components:
(1) An error-control coding technique for the payload to be transmitted in the water-
mark.
(2) An encoding technique to encode the resulting message.
(3) A reliable method for embedding the encoded message in the image without in-
troducing visible artifacts.
Components 1 and 2 apply to embed watermarks in any type of data while component
3 is specic to the embedding of watermarks in images.
6.1. Error control coding
Error control coding is applied to the message prior to encoding in order to include
redundancy, which makes the scheme more robust. Symbol-based Reed Solomon (RS)
codes are applied for this purpose. The advantages are:
 RS codes are capable of correcting symbol errors rather than bit errors and
 RS decoders can correct erasures as well as errors.
The erasure correcting capability is particularly useful for channels, which provide
reliability information on the received symbols. Symbols with low reliability are treated
as erased symbols. This approach is ecient in terms of error correction since one error
can be traded against two erasures in the decoding process.
RS codes have xed lengths, which depend on the size of the symbol alphabet.
For 8-bit symbols, RS codes have a length of 255 and they are convenient for byte
oriented data. In watermarking one wishes to use codes of shorter lengths than 255.
Such codes are easily obtained from the original RS codes by puncturing or shortening
(cf. [4]).
6.2. Encoding the message
During encoding, the message to be transmitted in the watermark is transformed into
a form suitable for use in the modulation of image components. At the same time, it
is encrypted using a suitable key.
One can easily combine spread spectrum-based watermarking with the cryptographic
key distribution techniques described earlier. The encoding procedure has access to
the cryptographic keys xH and yH (or their hash values), which are used to generate
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the seeds for the pseudo-random sequences as described below. Knowledge of the
corresponding key is required for recovering the message from the watermark.
A watermark can be embedded or extracted by the key owner using the same key.
From the point of view of embedding watermarks in images given the cryptographic
keys the sequences themselves can be generated. A good spread spectrum sequence
is one which combines desirable statistical properties such as uniformly low cross
correlation with cryptographic security.
Suppose we are given a message M (for example, that was provided with error
coding). The message has the binary form b1b2 : : : bL, where bi are its bits. This can
be written in the form of a set of symbols s1s2 : : : sM { most generally by a change in
a number base from 2 to B. The next stage is to encode each symbol si in the form
of a pseudo-random vector of length N , wherein each element of this vector either
takes the value 0 or 1. N is, for example, in the order of 1000{10000 (typically in
the order of 10% of the total number of Fourier components that can, theoretically, be
modulated).
To encode the rst symbol a pseudo-random sequence v of length N +B− 1 is gener-
ated. To encode a symbol of values where 0< s < B the elements vs; vs+1 : : : vs+N−1
are extracted as a vector r1 of length N . For the next symbol another independent
pseudo-random sequence is generated and the symbol encoded as a random vector r2.
Each successive symbol is encoded in the same way. Alternatively, one can use any
of the N cyclic shifts of the pseudo-random sequence v. Note that even if the same
symbol occurs in dierent positions in the sequence, no collision is possible because
the random sequences used to encode them are dierent { in fact they are statistically
independent. Finally, the entire sequence of symbols is encoded as the summation:
m=
P
i= 1::M ri.
The pseudo-random vector m has N elements, each varying between 0 and M . In
a next step, the elements of m are oset to make their mean zero. When decoding the
watermark, a vector m0 (read-out message) is derived from the stego-image. In oblivious
watermarking, m0 corresponds to the modulated Fourier coecients. Due to distortions
suered by the stego-image due to image processing, in general m0 will not be equal
to but will be \statistically similar" to m. To decode s from m0, the elements of m0
are rst oset to make their mean zero. Then, starting from the (known) seed, the rst
random sequence v of length N +B− 1 is generated and the correlation of v with m0
is calculated. The peak of the correlation indicates the oset s1 in the random sequence
that was used for generating r1. Then, the next random sequence v is generated and
cross-correlated with m0 to retrieve s2, etc. Reliable communications of the system are
best accommodated by using m-sequences that possess minimum cross correlation with
each other. This is the same as maximizing the Euclidean distance between vectors
v1; v2; v3 : : : . If M is suciently large, the statistical distribution of the message m
should approach a Gaussian distribution (according to the Central Limit Theorem).
A Gaussian-distributed watermark has the advantage that it is somewhat more dicult
to detect. The variance increases with order M 1=2; in other words, the expected peak
excursion of the sequence is only order M 1=2.
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6.3. Oblivious image authentication algorithm
In this section, we describe how to embed the encoded message m in the image in the
form of a watermark. The method is designed for robustness to operations generally
applied to images such as translation, cropping, rotating and scaling. (The method
is not designed for other types of data such as sound or text.) In order to achieve
robustness against circular translation, each image block is rst subjected to a Fourier
transform and the same watermark is embedded in each block so the watermark tiles
the entire image. Then, message m modulates the Fourier components. In addition to
this, a template is embedded in the image, which can be used for detecting a rotation
and scaling of the image when reading the watermark. Given a cover image the steps
for embedding a watermark in the image are as follows:
(1) If the image is a colour image, then compute the luminance component (for
example, by simply replacing each pixel by g=2+ r=3+ b=6, where g; r and b
are its green, red and blue components) and use these values for the following
calculations.
(2) Divide the image into adjacent blocks of size 128 128 pixels.
(3) Map the image luminance levels (or grey levels for a black and white image) to
a perceptually \at" domain by replacing them with their logarithm. The logarithm
is a good choice because it corresponds to the Weber{Fechner law which describes
the response of the human visual system to changes of luminance. This step
ensures that the intensity of the watermark is diminished in the darker regions of
the image where it would otherwise be visible.
(4) Compute the fast fourier transform (FFT) of each block. From the real and imagi-
nary components obtained in this way, calculate the corresponding magnitude and
phase components. The magnitude components are translation invariant and will
therefore be used in the following modulation steps. (However, it is possible to
derive translation invariants from the phase spectrum as well, which could also
be modulated).
(5) Select the magnitude components to be modulated. To encode a message m of
length N , a total number of N components are modulated. In non-oblivious water-
marking, any components can be modulated. For oblivious watermarking, because
of the interference of the cover-image with the watermark, the largest magnitude
components are avoided and only a band of frequencies are used. These mid-band
frequencies are chosen because they generally give a good compromise between
robustness and visibility of the watermark. There are two methods for selecting
the components to be modulated:
 The selection of the components to be modulated does not depend on the given
image. Rather, the same components are selected for every image. The author
as well as the reader of the watermark know the positions of the components
to be selected in advance.
 The largest components (inside the allowable frequency range) are used for
modulation using a perceptually adaptive approach.
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(6) Add a template by a second modulation of the magnitude components. This is
described in more detail below.
(7) Compute the inverse FFT using the phase components and the modulated magni-
tude components.
(8) Compute the inverse of the perceptual mapping function of step 3. For Weber{
Fechner law mapping, the inverse function is an exponential.
(9) Replace each watermarked block in the image to obtain the stego-image.
(10) If the image is a colour image, then re-scale the red, green and blue components
by the relative change in luminance introduced by embedding a watermark. Typ-
ically, the red, green and blue pixels occupy a byte each in program memory. If
overow or underow occurs then the pixel is set to the upper bound 255 or lower
bound 0, respectively.
When selecting the components to be modulated, care must be taken to preserve the
symmetry imposed on the Fourier components F(k1; k2) by the fact that the image
block is real valued: F(k1; k2)=F(N1− k1; N2− k2), where N1; N2 designate the size
of the image block. Once the magnitude components (M1; : : : ; MN ) to be modulated
are chosen, the corresponding value mi of message m is added to or subtracted from
the corresponding selected magnitude component Mi. Addition is applied, if the dif-
ference between the corresponding phase component Pi and a \reference phase" is
between 0 and . Subtraction is applied if the dierence is between  and 2. Note
that the reference phase for each watermark component should be the same for each
block. This provides robustness against translation and cropping (see below). Before
adding=subtracting the values mi to=from Mi, the vector m can be scaled to adjust
the magnitude of its elements to those of the components Mi. Generally, the elements
mi should be in the same order of magnitude as the components Mi. The depth of
modulation or amplitude of the embedded signal should depend on the objective mea-
sure of the perceptual signicance. The lower the perceptual signicance, the higher
should be the amplitude of the watermark. However, for simplicity, the amplitude for
all components is usually kept constant.
6.3.1. Template
As mentioned above, a template is added to the image in step 6. The following steps
have to be executed:
(1) Apply a log-polar map to the magnitude components, i.e. transform them into a
polar coordinate system (; log−r) with an angular and a logarithmic radius axis
respectively. In this representation, a scaling of the image leads to an oset of the
components along the log−r axis. A rotation of the image leads to an oset along
the  axis. Preferably, low pass ltering is used for interpolating the frequency
space components during this mapping. The magnitude components belonging to
very low or high frequencies are not mapped. The following modulation is only
applied to components in midband frequency range.
(2) Select the magnitude components in the log-polar coordinate system to be mod-
ulated. Typically, as few as 10 components can be modulated. The pattern T
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formed by the selected components in log polar space should be such that its
auto-correlation under translation is weak. There should be as little ambiguity as
possible in matching the shifted stego-image with the template. For this purpose,
the indices of the selected components should be coprime or at least be derived
from a two-dimensional random sequence.
(3) Map the modulated points by a change of coordinates back into frequency space.
The pattern T formed by the selected components in log polar space is predened
and known to the reader of the watermark. It must be noted that the calculation
of the log-polar transform is not required for embedding the template. The pattern
T of the components to be modulated in log-polar space can be mapped back to
the corresponding components in frequency space.
As will be explained below, the template is not required for non-oblivious watermarking
(since the original image can be used as the \template", in other words, the stego-image
can be registered with the original image). Also if the image is a colour image then
the luminance image is used during the following operations:
(1) Divide the image into adjacent blocks of size 128 128:
(2) Map the image luminance levels (or gray levels) to the perceptually \at" domain
by replacing them with their logarithm.
(3) For each block compute the FFT.
(4) Determine the rotation and scaling that the image suered by nding the template
in log-polar space and compensate for the rotation and scale.
(5) Read the modulated components to generate message m0.
(6) Once that the message m0 is recovered, it is demodulated and error corrected using
the methods described earlier.
Finding the template
The steps for nding the template are as follows:
(1) Apply a log-polar mapping to the magnitude components of the Fourier trans-
form. The magnitude components in the very low or high frequency range are
not mapped. The log-polar mapping is only applied to components in midband
frequency range.
(2) For oblivious watermarking, calculate the normalized cross correlation of the com-
ponents in log-polar space with the template pattern T that was used for generating
the template in step 6 and nd the point of best correlation. If the image has neither
been rotated or scaled, this point is at the origin. Scaling leads to a corresponding
oset along the log−r axis, rotation to a corresponding oset along the  axis.
(3) For non-oblivious watermarking, the log polar transform of the Fourier components
of the cover-image can be used instead of template pattern T for retrieving scaling
and rotation. The cross correlation can be calculated eciently using conventional
Fourier techniques.
6.4. Properties of the watermark
In the following, some of the properties of the watermark generated using the steps
described above are discussed. We rst review some of the fundamental properties of
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the Fourier transform which lead to robustness against cropping, scaling and translation
and rotation.
6.4.1. Denition
Let the image be a real valued continuous function f(x1; x2) dened on an integer-
valued Cartesian grid 06x1<N1; 06x2<N2.
The discrete Fourier transform (DFT) is dened as follows:
F(k1; k2)=
N1−1P
n1=0
N2−1P
n2=0
f(x1; x2)e−j2x1k1=N1−j2x2k2=N2 : (1)
The inverse transform is
f(x1; x2)=
1
N1N2
N1−1P
k1=0
N2−1P
k2=0
F(k1; k2)e j2k1x1=N1+j2k2x2=N2 : (2)
The DFT of a real image is generally complex valued. This leads to magnitude and
phase representation for the image:
A(k1; k2)= [F(k1; k2)]; (3)
(k1; k2)=\F(k1; k2): (4)
6.4.2. General properties of the Fourier transform
It is extremely instructive to study the eect of an arbitrary linear transform on the
spectrum of an image. From this study we will conclude that it is possible to undo the
eect of any linear transformation on an image, even if the image is cropped.
Once N1 =N2 (i.e. square blocks) the kernel of the DFT contains a term of the form
x1k1 + x2k2 = [ x1 x2 ]

k1
k2

: (5)
If we compute a linear transform on the spatial coordinates

x1
x2

!T

x1
x2

(6)
then one can see that the value of the DFT will not change 2 if

k1
k2

! (T−1)T

k1
k2

: (7)
2 The DFT will be invariant except for a scaling factor which depends on the Jacobian of Transformation,
namely the determinant of the transformation matrix T .
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6.4.3. FFT: rotation
Consider a rotation matrix
T=

cos  − sin 
sin  cos 

(8)
Therefore,
(T−1)T =

cos  − sin 
sin  cos 

(9)
Rotating the image through an angle  in the spatial domain causes the Fourier repre-
sentation to be rotated through the same angle.
F(k1 cos − k2 sin ; k1 sin + k2 cos )
$f(x1 cos − x2 sin ; x1 sin + x2 cos ) (10)
Note that the grid is rotated so the value of the image at the new grid points may not
be dened. The value of the image at the nearest valid grid point can be estimated by
interpolation.
6.4.4. FFT: scale
Consider a scaling matrix
T=

1 0
0 2

: (11)
Therefore,
(T−1)T =
"
1
1
0
0 12
#
: (12)
Hence, scaling the axes in the spatial domain causes an inverse scaling in the frequency
domain
1

F

k1

;
k2


$f(x1; x2): (13)
6.4.5. FFT: translation
Shifts in the spatial domain cause a linear shift in the phase component
F(k1; k2) exp [−j(ak1 + bk2)]$f(x1 + a; x2 + b): (14)
Note that both F(k1; k2) and its dual f(x1; x2) are periodic functions so it is implicitly
assumed that translations cause the image to be \wrapped around". We shall refer
to this as a circular translation or a cyclic shift. From property 14 of the Fourier
transform it is clear that spatial shifts aect only the phase representation of an image.
This leads to the well known result that the magnitude of the Fourier transform is a
circular translation invariant.
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6.4.6. Robustness to cropping
One feature of translation invariants developed using the Fourier transform is that
they are invariant to circular translations (or cyclic shifts). This is used to construct
watermarks that are invariant to cropping. As mentioned above, the image is split into
blocks and the watermark is applied to each block. In other words, the same modulation
pattern is applied to the Fourier components of each block, wherein the modulation
pattern is given by the corresponding encoded messages m. Suppose that the watermark
in a standard size block will be of the form: T = [AB;CD] where the submatrices
A; B; C and D are of arbitrary size. A circular translation of such a watermark is of the
form: S = [DC;BA]. The original stego-image is tiled with watermarks in the pattern
[TTTT ;TTTT ;TTTT ]. A little thought demonstrates that a cropped section of the matrix
will carry a watermark in the form [SSSS; SSSS; SSSS]. When reading the watermark of
the cropped image, each block carries the watermark S. Since S is a circular transform
of T , it can be read directly in the Fourier domain using the steps outlined above.
Note, however, that the cover-image is not tiled, only the watermark is. Therefore,
while cropping merely induces a circular translation of the watermark in each block,
the change of image in each block is not a circular translation.
The optimum size of block depends on a number of dierent factors. A size that is a
power of two is useful because the FFT can be used. The block size also must be small
enough to withstand cropping but large enough to comfortably contain a watermark.
Heuristically, the best compromise for block size is 128.
6.4.7. Robustness to scaling and rotation
As mentioned earlier, reading the template in log-polar space allows to detect and
measure any scaling and=or rotation that was applied to the image. This information
can then be used for reading the watermark. Since the reader knows the pattern that
was used for modulating the magnitude components, he can identify the modulated
components in the scaled and rotated image and extract the message m0. Note that the
apparatus does not explicitly use a rotation and scale invariant watermark but instead
searches the parameter space of rotations and scales. Since searching the space of
rotation and scales in the frequency or space domain is quite complicated, the log-
polar map is used to map these parameters to Cartesian coordinates where searching
can be carried out using ecient correlation techniques.
6.4.8. Robustness to translations
By translation, we mean zero padding of the image such as would occur if an image
were placed on a scanner and scanned. In this case the eect on the watermark blocks
may be understood in terms of simple signal and image processing theory. Eectively,
zero padding is a multiplication by a rectangular window function in the spatial do-
main. In the frequency domain this approximates to a convolution with a cardinal sine
function. Generally, this blurring of frequency space is not severe. If more than about
one third of an watermark block is present the watermark can still be decoded.
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6.4.9. Robustness to compression
The watermark is also resistant to compression. It is well known that transform-based
image compression techniques favour low frequencies in the sense that low frequency
content in the original image is better preserved in the compressed image. For this
reason, it would seem that a low frequency watermark would be better. However, as
mentioned earlier in oblivious watermarking it is necessary to avoid low frequencies
for embedding information because the image interferes with the watermark at those
frequencies. Fortunately, a compromise is possible: judicious selection of a band of
frequencies leads to a watermark that is both oblivious and is suciently resistant
to lossy image compression. One helpful factor is that there are relatively few low
frequency components in which to embed a spread spectrum signal. Using mid-band
frequencies actually improves the robustness of the mark because of the increased
redundancy of the encoding of the payload.
6.4.10. Robustness of the template pattern
The template pattern is essential to determine the rotation and scaling of the image.
Thus its robustness is highly important. There is a good case for arguing that the
template is somewhat more robust than the watermark. The reason for this is, that
the template actually has to carry less information than the watermark. For example,
suppose it is only possible to recover the watermark if the rotation angle and scaling
factor recovered using the template are both 99:9% accurate. To give 99:9% accuracy
one needs log2(1000)  9 bit. Specifying both the angle and the scaling factor therefore
needs around 18 bit which is considerably less than the amount of information contained
in a typical watermark (about 128 bit).
6.4.11. Redundancy
The watermark is embedded in blocks of a xed size with exactly the same water-
mark embedded in each block. This means that the watermark can be recovered from a
single block only. However, the chance of extracting the watermark correctly increases
if one has more than one block. Therefore, the reliability of watermark extraction
increases with the size of image, as one might expect.
7. Implementation
To demonstrate the feasibility of the approach, a Java=C++-based copyright pro-
tection and authentication environment for digital images has been implemented. The
PKI, H, C and B application processes all implement a Graphical User Interface and
a server, supporting both console users and other requests through a socket interface.
The communication between the application and the dispatching watermarking proxy
process is achieved through a socket interface, giving us a good control over com-
munication security and application location. Flexibility is just one advantage of this
technique: the database, watermarking engine and GUI can run on dierent and distant
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Fig. 3. The copyright holder application.
machines. For the rst version of our implementation, we have assumed that all parts
of the application are run on the same secure machine. It is, therefore, not necessary
to protect the privacy of the connections used by the application internally.
The copyright holder can load images, enter the copyright information, contact C,
embed the watermark into the cover-image, save all data encrypted in a database and
sell the digital image. Fig. 3 illustrates an example of the loaded cover-image together
with the copyright information.
We have seen previously that C is important to solve many of the possible attacks
of fraudulent people. The C is even indispensable for having legally bound copyright
certicates. Today’s copyright laws require that C is in possession of a copy of the
cover-image. We can therefore list the following necessary functionality’s of C appli-
cation:
 Legally embedded institution backed by the government.
 Provide a server to answer incoming copyright requests.
 Verify consistency of all received copyright requests.
 Save all information persistently and securely, since the data has to be recovered
after any restart of the server.
Because all transactions are executed electronically, it is obvious that all the re-
quests must be authenticated, secure (integrity, condentiality) and transactional. The
legal binding further requires non-repudiation. In particular, the persistence property is
necessary in order to leave the copyright certicate valid, even if the legal dispute is
20 years later. The data integrity is needed so nobody could claim that the copyright
certicate was forged by C. We can note that the trust that H puts into C is substan-
tial. Therefore, C should be backed by some public authority such as the chamber of
commerce.
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Fig. 4. The copyright certicate center server application.
Fig. 4 shows a screen shot of C GUI. We can note on the console window that the
application has created C server on port 4001 and is waiting for incoming copyright
requests. The user can list all the copyrights issued. The PKI, implemented as a trusted
third party (TTP) server, issues all certicates for all users. On the basis of the authen-
tically distributed public key from the TTP, a public=private key-pair along with its
associated certicate may be generated and then passed back as ciphered information
to the client. These operations are based on a specic request from H. The request in-
cludes a password for online key generation, key distribution and certicate handling.
The request is protected on the basis of the TTP’s public key which was authenti-
cally distributed before. The buyer application can contact a copyright holder image
server residing per default at port 4003. The buyer can enter the name of the desired
image and if the image was already registered at C, H image server sends back the
image.
8. Conclusion
We have presented a new approach for the copyright protection of digital images.
This approach is based on asymmetric cryptographic protocols and techniques. In con-
trast to any other scheme, the combination of a spread spectrum based technique in
conjunction with an asymmetric cryptographic technique allows the construction of a
one-way function, since only H is able to verify the private watermark. In addition,
he may prove that he has the adequate key by verifying the signature of the seed for
the payload data. Even if the dierent phases of the approach are known in the public,
the security of our approach is not compromised. Compared to other approaches, the
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following new properties have been identied:
(1) Dierent security services for the communication, such as mutual authentication,
integrity, condentiality and non-repudiation are supported along with the pro-
tection against copyright infringement by the system with one asymmetric cryp-
tographic key pair.
(2) The present technique enables a strong binding relation between the image ID, the
image and H if H registers his copyright at C. If an image is watermarked later
by an unauthorized person, the time stamp in the copyright certicates resolves
the copyright ownership.
(3) H does not have to reveal his private cryptographic key if ownership verication
has to be applied by a dierent legal party.
(4) The present technique supports the transferral of copyrights. If a copyright is
transferred to another legal party, corresponding copyright revocation certicates
may be generated.
(5) Digital signatures are used for the security of the communication between dierent
parties and for the authenticity of the data embedded in a public watermark of
an image. No signature labeling techniques of the complete image are applied by
the system.
(6) Circular translation invariants are used as a means of constructing digital water-
marks that are invariant to cropping.
(7) In contrast to some known techniques, the system does not require a database of
watermarks since only the keys are required to embed or extract a watermark.
(8) Information is retrieved from the log polar domain of the Fourier transform. Fre-
quency components are modulated which are oblivious to the cover-image but
which also have the property that they form an unambiguous non-repeated pat-
tern in log-polar space. They are used for determining the degree of rotation and
scaling suered by a stego-image in the absence of the cover-image. Co-prime
frequencies are useful for generating such a pattern or template. Uniform random
sampling of log-polar space is another method that can be applied.
The approach presented for the copyright protection of digital images can also be ex-
tended to other data such as video, audio, and binary data. We are actually investigating
new spread spectrum techniques for the watermarking of audio and binary data.
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